Nebraskans vs. the State Department (Abby M.) Lisa Hymas Lisa Hymas is a senior editor at Grist.org. Updated October 28, 2011, 1:53 PM Forget the tree huggers. Even many red-blooded red-staters don't trust that the Keystone XL pipeline would be safe and leak-free. Keystone XL pipeline projectNati Harnik/Associated Press Residents of Atkinson, Neb., at a hearing on the Keystone XL pipeline project. Husker football fans booed a TransCanada-sponsored video at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln's Memorial Stadium on Sept. 10, spurring the school's athletic department to drop a sponsorship deal. Nebraska's Republican governor, Dave Heineman, is calling on the Obama administration to deny a permit for the project; the state's senators, one Republican and one Democrat, oppose it, too. And in a State Department hearing in Lincoln, Neb., on Sept. 27, about 80 percent of the 1,000-plus citizens in attendance were opposed to the pipeline -- despite the fact that pipeline boosters bused in sympathetic crowds from other states. A big worry is that the pipeline's proposed route through Nebraska would cross about 250 miles of the Ogallala Aquifer, the nation's largest underground source for drinking water and crop irrigation. Nebraskans don't buy the assurances from TransCanada and the U.S. State Department that the pipeline poses no serious risks to their water, land and livelihoods; farmers and ranchers in other Great Plains states don't either. Just look at TransCanada's Keystone I, a smaller pipeline from Alberta to Illinois that began operation in June 2010. In just over a year, this pipeline has leaked at least 14 times, including a spill of about 21,000 gallons in North Dakota -- even though TransCanada predicted that spills of 2,100 gallons or more should be expected to happen only once every seven years. The tar sands bitumen that Keystone XL would carry is thick, corrosive, unstable and hard to clean up. Plains Justice, a nonprofit organization, has documented how ill-equipped the sparsely populated northern Plains states are to respond to an oil spill. The Keystone XL could even be a terrorist target. Too risky? Absolutely -- and that's even before you get into the grave threat that tar sands oil poses to our global climate. &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& The Truth About Aquifers (Megan N.) James Goeke James Goeke, a research hydrogeologist, is professor emeritus at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. Updated October 4, 2011, 3:13 PM Surface water we can see; groundwater is an act of faith: I say that when I talk about aquifers. Because groundwater is out of sight, it lends itself to many misconceptions. This is the situation with the Ogallala/High Plains aquifer, as it relates to the proposed Keystone XL pipeline. An aquifer is any subsurface material that stores and transmits water in usable amounts. Underground water by itself is not an aquifer; the definition must include the host material. The Ogallala aquifer, named after the rock formation that has nearly unimaginable water riches, underlies much of the Great Plains. Recently, the U.S. Geological Survey has begun using the term “High Plains Aquifer” to include not just the Ogallala formation but also rock units below and more recent deposits near the surface. During the past 40 years, my colleagues and I at the Conservation and Survey Division of the University of Nebraska have focused our research on this aquifer. I personally have drilled more than 1,000 test holes into and through its complexities; I have analyzed the volume and behavior of the waters it holds. Here are several important findings. 1. The slope of the regional water table is from west to east; the deep waters within the host rocks move persistently downhill eastward. Approximately 80 percent of the Ogallala Aquifer lies to the west of the proposed alignment, “uphill” of the pipeline’s route. Spilled oil could not move upward against gravity. 2. Along much of the alignment, the depth to water is over 50 feet. Sediments above the top of the aquifer contain fine-grained deposits like silts and clays. In a 25-year study of an oil spill near Bemidji, Minn., the Geological Survey reported that “apparently fine-grained layers impeded the infiltration and redistribution of oil.” 3. If areas of the Ogallala were exposed to leaks from the pipeline, the highly varied layers within the rock formation itself would serve to localize the impact of a spill. 4. In places along the pipeline’s route, there are locations where the water table is near or at the land surface. It is my understanding that in these areas, TransCanada will encase the pipeline in a waterproof covering and cement jacket. All this comforts me with the knowledge that a leak from the XL pipeline would pose a minimal risk to the aquifer as a whole. However, we should require TransCanada to post a bond for any cleanup in the event of a spill. With that in place, we should approve the pipeline while simultaneously implementing an aggressive national policy that mandates energy efficiencies and finances the development of alternative energy sources for transportation. &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& What Choice Do We Have? (Maria P.) Adam R. Brandt Adam R. Brandt is the acting assistant professor in the department of Energy Resources Engineering at Stanford University. Updated October 4, 2011, 3:13 PM The economic pressures to develop the oil sands are enormous. Much of the world’s “easy” conventional oil has been found, and OPEC and the former Soviet Union hold most of what is left. In addition, an emerging global middle class will demand greater amounts of fuel in the future. To put this in perspective, in 2010 the average Chinese citizen consumed only one ninth of the oil that the average American used, so there is plenty of appetite for more oil. In response to the increasing demand, production from oil sands has grown to about 2 percent of oil output. And as of early 2009, projects that are operating, under construction or in the planning process amount to more than 7 million barrels per day of output. This equals about 70 percent of Saudi Arabia’s production. Such a huge expansion would have a significant environmental impact. Available evidence suggests that oil sands, on a “well-to-wheels” basis, have 15 to 20 percent higher greenhouse emissions than conventional oil. This is because of increased energy demand during extraction and the use of high-carbon fuels like petroleum coke. Also, water pollution concerns plague mining-based projects that produce large volumes of tailings (a contaminated, watery waste product). The concerns of environmental groups fighting the Keystone XL pipeline are therefore understandable: The environmentalists ultimately aim to keep a trillion barrels of oil in the ground (rather than in the atmosphere) and to replace it with cleaner alternatives. So why are we developing the oil sands at all? The environmental consequences will affect Canadians near the oil sands and contribute to climate change, burdening future generations. But economic benefits currently flow to all oil users (including each of us) and to oil sands producers. The world’s poor cannot afford to be choosy about the source of their oil. And while many Americans seem ready to assign blame to oil sands producers, few are willing to reduce their own oil demand. Clearly, the oil sands are not the ideal way to meet our energy needs. Yet here we find ourselves in a state of inertia because of depleting conventional resources, technological challenges to cleaner alternatives and weak polices on greenhouse gases. Ultimately, in order to avoid the environmental impact of oil sands, we must reduce our demand for oil. This requires improving the efficiency of vehicles as well as developing low-impact alternative fuel vehicles (like electric cars powered by natural gas or renewables). Such a strategy will help us bring energy resources to the developing world while reducing the risks to the environment. &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& Lessons From Alaska (Ed S.) Tim Bradner Tim Bradner is the resources writer for The Alaska Journal of Commerce, a weekly business newspaper published in Anchorage. He also writes an economics column for The Anchorage Daily News. Updated October 4, 2011, 3:13 PM With two exceptions, the petroleum industry’s record with safety in oil transportation has been good. Two significant spills were not on the pipeline but at either end: The 1989 Prince William Sound spill was caused by the grounding of the tanker Exxon Valdez, and a 2006 series of spills on the North Slope was because of corrosion in oil field pipelines operated by BP. On the 800-mile-long Trans Alaska Pipeline System itself, there was one incidence of a relatively small spill caused by corrosion, one significant spill when an above-ground section of pipeline was punctured by a bullet, one incidence in which a spill at a pump station was caused by a meter malfunction, causing a standby storage tank to overflow, and an incident in early 2010 where there was a small leak in a pump station. The latter two spills, the tank overflow and pump station piping leak, were kept in a containment system. Alaskans feel the oil pipeline benefited from sharp controversy over its construction in the 1970s and a delay in its construction to allow time for development of environmental safeguards like remote valve closure and leak detection systems, and engineering solutions to permafrost and earthquake dangers. Although the Alaskan experience has been generally positive, the significant spills (tanker spill in 1989 and oil field pipeline spill in 2006) resulted in major changes in federal and state regulatory oversight of pipeline and tanker operations. The 1989 spill resulted in Congressional passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 that established new standards for tanker operations, including tanker escort systems and the first-ever provisions for independent citizen “watchdog” groups, such as the Prince William Sound Regional Citizens Advisory Council, to do independent audits and report findings to the pipeline operator and federal and state regulatory agencies. The trans-Alaska pipeline itself is regulated by a federal-state regulatory group, the Joint Pipeline Office, where federal and state regulators work in one office to coordinate pipeline oversight and inspections. The Alaskan experience indicates that pipeline systems are generally safe but they require government regulation as to safe practices and continuing inspections. Regulatory agencies must have adequate authority and budgets, and industry must be given clear performance criteria in regulations. &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& The Odds of Human Error (Julie Van S.) Najmedin Meshkati Najmedin Meshkati is a professor of civil and environmental engineering at the University of Southern California. Updated October 28, 2011, 1:49 PM The proposed Keystone XL pipeline would be one of the longest and most technologically complex pipeline systems in the world. For the foreseeable future, despite increasing levels of computerization and automation, such complex systems will operate under the centralized control of a few human operators. Almost all major oil and gas pipeline systems are run by operators who use computer-based workstations in control rooms. According to a major study of pipeline accidents and spills conducted by the National Transportation Safety Board, more than half of such accidents were caused by the operators' action, reaction or inaction. The computer systems can also contribute to accidents, influencing recovery time or affecting the magnitude. The most recent natural gas pipeline explosion, in San Bruno, Calif., that killed eight people and destroyed three dozen houses last fall, once more highlighted the critical role of human and organizational factors in the safe and spill-free operation of hazardous liquid and gas transmission pipeline systems. According to the N.T.S.B., it was “an organizational accident” that was primarily caused by “a failure of the entire system.” Thus, before making the decision to build the Keystone XL, we must ensure that it doesn’t become another victim of those factors that have plagued pipeline systems in the U.S. And this can only be done by a total systems reorientation through strengthening the regulatory oversight and improving the management of pipeline technology. Above all, we need to devise a robust organizational and operating system, nurture a strong safety culture and improve human-systems integration. &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& Why Take the Risk? (Jake Y.) Mohammad Najafi Mohammad Najafi is an assistant professor and the director of the Center for Underground Infrastructure Research and Education at the University of Texas at Arlington. He is the founder and editor in chief of the Journal of Pipeline Systems Engineering and Practice. Updated October 28, 2011, 1:49 PM Pipelines are one of the safest modes of transportation. However, as with any other constructed infrastructure, they need to be properly installed and maintained. Underground pipelines tend to be out of sight and out of mind. Sometimes the owners and operators do not follow the best construction and asset management practices. While new technologies are available for inspection and real-time monitoring of pipelines, they require advanced planning and additional investment and operational costs. Lack of proper inspection and monitoring, especially for oil and gas pipelines, may result in catastrophic failures, damage the environment and injure or kill people. Since no technology is risk-free, the best way to avoid pipeline system failures is to avoid the extraction of oil from the sensitive Alberta wilderness. We should instead use more renewable energy sources and encourage the conservation of fossil fuel.